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California's Fla wed
Surface Water Rights
MICHAEL HANEMANN, CAITLIN DYCKNIAN,
AND DAMIAN PARK

IN THE BEGINNING: A CHAOTIC SITUATION

California sprang into existence following the discovery of gold in
1848. Aside from domestic use, the first major use of water in California was in mining. The first mining consisted of placer mining of alluvial deposits in stream beds throughout the Sierra foothills . As those
deposits were depleted, hydraulic mining arose, in which high-pressure
jets of water were used to remove overlying earth from upland goldbearing deposits. That type of mining, first employed in 1853, required
substantial water diversions.
When California entered the Union in I 8 50, the English common
law was adopted as the "rule of decision" in courts, including the doctrine of riparian rights for surface water 1 (it was also the governing
doctrine in the rest of the Union). Riparian rights entitle the owner of
land bordering a surface water body ("riparian" land) to use the water
on his or her riparian land. This is a right to use water, not a right of
ownership, and it inheres only in riparian lands. Riparian rights remain
with the riparian land regardless of changes in ownership. Water under
a riparian right cannot be used on non.riparian land. 2 The right is shared
equally among all riparians: they own access to the stream as "tenants
in common." They can divert water as long as this does not impair the
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rights of other riparians. No specific quantity attaches to a riparian
right. If a riparian originally applied X, this does not preclude him from
applying 5X later. Nonuse does not terminate the right. There is no
recording of the volume diverted . No institution administers the riparian right. Disputes are resolved through litigation among riparians.
The riparian doctrine was logical where it originated, in a humid region
with plentiful streamflow. Stream.flow is treated as a common pool to be
shared among all riparian landowners. But in an arid region like California, where rivers can run dry by the late summer and annual streamflow
can vary by an order of magnitude, there needs to be a specific mechanism
for allocating limited stream.flow. The riparian right lacks this.
Using water for hydraulic mining violated riparian requirements. In
most cases, the deposits being mined were not located on riparian land.
And the miners did not own the land where water was being diverted or
used-these were public lands. Consequently, a new type of water right
was developed, adapted from the rules developed by miners for the
right to a mining claim. The miners "met and organized mining districts, adopting rules for the definition of their property rights ....
These rules limited the size of claims .... They required miners to post
notices of their claims and to record them with district recorders .... To
retain their claims, miners had to work them with diligence .... When
questions of right arose, they were settled by reference to priority ...
first in time, first in right." With the emergence of hydraulic mining,
"the miners applied the same rules to water as they had to land-first in
time, first in right. To perfect the right, ditches had to be dug with diligence and the water applied to beneficial use " (Dunbar I983, 61).
In 18 51, the California legislature endorsed the mining-camp rules as
state law. Subsequently, district courts applied the principle of first possession to water cases. In 1855, the California Supreme Court endorsed
what became known as the appropriative water right. The right to
divert water is based on the time and quantity of the initial diversion
creating that right. The link between ownership of land and ownership
of water is severed. The locations of water diversion and application
can be different. If there is too little streamflow, the senior appropriators
divert their full quantity until the stream is exhausted, while the remaining (junior) appropriators receive nothing. 3
The Supreme Court's rulings did not extinguish the concept of a
riparian right, and California courts continued to uphold it. In I866
and r870, Congress gave recognition to appropriative rights. In I872,
California's legislature formally recognized appropriative rights and
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codified the procedures for acquiring them. The codification maintained
a dual system of appropriative and riparian rights.
While the appropriative water right was modeled after the right to a
mining claim, crucial differences existed between the two resources that
rendered the right less well suited to water than to mining. The nature
of the economic activity was not the same, and the institutions for
recording and enforcing the property right functioned very differently.
According to Clay and Wright (2005, 163), gold mining was "a race
to find a small number of high payoff claims." As they note (157): "Typically a miner worked a claim only long enough to determine its potential. If he decided it was a relatively low-value claim-as most were-he
continued the search [elsewhere] .. .. Because miners were continually
looking for new and better sites even as they worked their present holdings, mining district rules were as much concerned with procedures for
the abandonment and repossession of claims as they were with protection of the rights of existing claimholders." Mining was thus different
from a production-oriented activity such as irrigated agriculture. Mining
rules sought to ensure the "orderly turnover" of mining sites to maximize the chance of a bonanza discovery, not to promote land settlement.
The interactions among miners were fundamentally different from
those among water users, and played out over a much larger spatial
scale. For a miner, the question was "Is someone else working a claim
at this location? If not, I will." For an irrigator, it was not enough to
know whether someone else was diverting water at this location: it was
also necessary to know whether other diversions were occurring on the
same stream. 4
Mining districts provided a nongovernmental apparatus that was
quite effective in recording mining claims. Posting a claim at the site and
recording it with the mining district was a reasonable procedure. Furthermore, the mining districts played some role in mining claim enforcement and dispute resolution. Mining district codes typically specified
procedures for settling disputes over contested claims (Clay and Wright
2005, 163-67), although those procedures were not necessarily final.
While imperfect, the system based on mining districts, the posting of
claims, and the right of first possession was relatively coherent and promoted its objective: orderly and rapid exploration of mining sites.
The situation with appropriative water rights was entirely different.
In an arid region, land is worthless without water, and the objective was
to ensure continued access to water. Because of the spatial scale of
potential interactions among competing water users, posting a claim
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along a river bank on a two-foot stake was a much less transparent
means of recording a property right for water than for mining. Property
right quantification was inherently less precise. The spatial area claimed
for exploration was essential to mining. With water, the volume of
water diverted during some time at a particular location comprised the
claim. But volume is a problematic measure of this right, because the
diversion occurs intermittently; the exercise of the property right is not
uniform over time, as with a land claim.
In additional to being poorly quantified and not transparently recorded, another crucial difference between an appropriative water right
and a mining claim was that the former lacked any administrative apparatus for verifying or enforcing the priority date or the amount of the
right. The mining districts played no role in the recording or enforcement of appropriative water rights, even for hydraulic mining, and there
was no other entity, governmental or nongovernmental, that performed
this role. In the event of a dispute among water users, whether about the
seniority or the quantity of a right, the only recourse was litigation.
Litigation has many weaknesses as a method of dispute resolution.
Litigation is time-consuming. And water use for irrigation is especially
time-sensitive-crops need water during the growing season . Litigation
could not resolve a dispute in time to save that year's crop. Litigation
was costly. The decree bound only the parties to the litigation, not other
water users omitted from the litigation .5 Finally, there was no mechanism to enforce a judicial decree resulting from litigation, except further
litigation for contempt of court (Chandler 1913, 149).
Given the differences in the nature of the resource and the way it was
used, mining claims provided a poor analogy for water use . .The system
of appropriative water rights based on the right of first possession was
considerably less coherent than the system of mining claims based on
the same principle.
The 1872 code changed things marginally. Under that code, in addition to posting the claim at the river bank, a water user was required to
file a copy with the county recorder and to commence construction of
the diversion facility within 60 days of posting. But the county recorder
played no role in verifying the claim to an appropriative water right,
checking whether there was sufficient streamflow for that amount to
have been diverted as claimed, checking whether construction was initiated (or completed), monitoring diversions to ensure subsequent conformity with the water right, or sharing information about appropriative rights claimed with other counties bordering the same stream.
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Moreover, 11onstat11tory appropriations were still legal-made, as
before 1872, by posting a notice at the site of the diversion and without
recording the claim with the county recorder. A property rights scheme
lacking effective recording and enforcement is a contradiction in terms.
Yet that characterizes the appropriative right to water in California
until 1914.

WHAT OTHER STATES DID

After the California Gold Rush, other major discoveries of gold occurred
in Colorado (1858-1859), Nevada (1859), Idaho (1860), Montana
(1862-1864), and Arizona (r863}, leading to immigration into those
states. Like California, they adopted the English common law and, with
it, riparian water rights. In those gold rushes, as in California, the miners organized mining districts and adopted rules to protect claims to
mining rights and to water. As in California, the mining was being conducted on public lands and required something other than a riparian
right. The new mining districts copied California in adopting an appropriative right to water based on the right of first possession, which was
subsequently recognized by the state courts and legislatures.
Colorado was the first western state to enact laws for the administration of surface water rights. This came about gradually. In 1861, in its
first session, the territorial legislature endorsed "the records, laws and
proceedings of each mining district," and also enacted a statute authorizing the appropriation of water for irrigation of both riparian and nonriparian lands. Under this law, there was no requirement to record the
appropriation. The first court decision dealing with appropriative
rights, in 1872, upheld this as a necessity in Colorado's climate. In
r 876, the state constitution stated that " priority of appropriation sha ll
give the better right as between those using water for the same purpose." The question of whether riparian rights still existed in Colorado
was answered in 1882 when the state Supreme Court declared that the
riparian doctrine was "inapplicable to Colorado." Eventually, all the
mountain states followed Colorado in establishing prior appropriation
as the exclusive right to surface water. 6
At first, following the r86r legislation, appropriative water rights in
Colorado functioned in the same incoherent manner as in California,
with no recording requirement and no state administrative apparatus for
verification, enforcement or monitoring. As in California, there was
chaos, and "it was impossible to determine the number and priorities of
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the appropriations of a stream except through an expensive adjudication
lawsuit" (Dunbar 1983, 87). The drought of 1874 triggered interest in a
new legislative solution when diverters along the Cache la Poudre River
failed to agree on how to divide the depleted streamflow, and upstream
diverters with junior rights "took what they wanted, depriving the downstream appropriators of their legitimate supply of irrigation water" {87).
Legislation in 1879 established ten water districts around the state,
each with a water commissioner who was to enforce the distribution of
water based on prior rights . The water commissioners had no powers to
determine the priority of rights or resolve conflicts regarding rights.
Instead, judges could initiate an inquiry into a water right and make a
finding. This legislation was subsequently challenged because it gave
judges the power to initiate an inquiry on their own authority without
waiting for someone to .file a suit in the conventional manner. The 1881
Adjudication Act resolved this: it required irrigators with existing
appropriative rights to file their claims for priority with district courts
by June 1881 to determine the priority and quantity of their right.
The Colorado system was only partly successful. The administrative
system for enforcing court water rights decrees worked well and was
widely admired and emulated. But the reliance on judges was problematic: they did not consult with the state engineer, lacked engineering
training, and typically did not verify the accuracy of data presented in
court. Consequently, irrigators made extravagant claims, which judges
then accepted. The water rights decreed by the courts varied erratically,
with no rationale or relation to actual use (Meade 1903, 149-55).
The situation improved slowly. In 1887, statewide recording of
appropriative rights claims was initiated (Meade 1903, 144). In 1899,
the water commissioners received additional powers, including the
power to arrest and prosecute anyone violating orders for the opening or
closing of head-gates. In 1903 and 1919, the Colorado legislature completed the adjudication procedure. The 1903 Adjudication Act provided
the courts with authority to adjudicate all other appropriative water
rights in the same manner as irrigation rights. The 1919 Adjudication
Limitation Act was designed to settle the priorities of all water rights. It
required any claimant to an appropriation to submit the claim for adjudication by January 1921; failure to do so caused a presumption of abandonment (Hobbs 1999, 9).
In 1886 and 1888, the neighboring state of Wyoming largely copied
Colorado's legislation of 1879 and r88r. It soon found the same defects
as in Colorado: "there was no central register of appropriation claims . . . .
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Many of the streams were overappropriated, and few had been adjudicated. Of those that had been [adjudicated] the decreed rights were
excessive and inconsistent" (Dunbar r983, ro6). Reacting to this situation, on attaining statehood in 1890, the Wyoming legislature created an
administrative system for the control of water rights. The admjnistrative
apparatus both conferred water rights (handled by courts in Colorado)
and administered them.
The Wyoming system created water divisions and a Board of Control
consisting of the State Engineer and the superintendents of the water divisions. A person wishing to appropriate water applied for a permit from
the State Engineer. If the State Engineer determined that unappropriated
water was available and the diversion was not "detrimental to the public
welfare," the permit was granted. No appropriation after 1890 was valid
without a permit. The division superintendents monitored diversions and
enforced priority. The Board of Control adjudicated streams, subject to
appeal to the district courts.
The permit procedure did not apply retroactively to water rights
acquired before 1890, but the 1890 legislation specified a procedure to
address those rights. Under the stream adjudication process, the owners
of all water rights, including those acquired before 1890, were required
to file their claim with the State Board of Control. Failure to do this
extinguished the right (Squillace 1991, 97) . Under this scheme, all of
Wyoming's streams were adjudicated by 1922; any users who failed to
claim a pre-1890 right lost it (Squillace 1989, 324).
Over the period of 1895-1909, other western states adopted versions
of the Wyoming system. 7 Only Oregon copied Colorado's court-based
determination of water rights. The Wyoming system aroused controversy for vesting the determination of water rights in an administrative
board rather than the courts. Engineers supported this, but lav.ryers and
some water users opposed it. After 1902, the federal government advocated it as a precondition for receiving water projects from the new
Bureau of Reclamation, which proved decisive.
In summary, all the other western states moved to systems for the
conferral, recording, and administration of appropriative rights that,
while not perfect, were comprehensive and orderly. Those systems generated usable records of rights holders and their seniority. Moreover,
there was a local administrative apparatus for monitoring diversions,
ensuring conformity with the decreed appropriative right, and enforcing seniority in the event of shortage. Of all the states, Colorado was the
most successful at verifying water rights. In some other states, gaps still
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remain between the amounts of water claimed and actually put to beneficial use (Tarlock 2000, 882). Nevertheless, there is a relatively coherent system for recording, monitoring, and enforcing appropriative
water rights.

WHAT CALIFORNIA DID

While other western states regularized the administration of appropriative rights, California did nothing, even as the use of water for irrigation
grew dramatically. The acreage irrigated in California increased from
roughly 60,000 acres in 1870 to 300,000 acres in 1880, and then to r.4
million acres in 1900, 2. 7 million acres in r9ro, and 4.2 million acres
in 1920 (Rhode 1995, table 1). The expansion was partly associated
with the assemblage of large land holdings, often obtained through
dubious acquisitions of Spanish land grants and fraudulent acquisitions
of public lands disposed under the 1850 Swamp Act and the 1877
Desert Land Act. Public land purchases were legally restricted to 3 20
acres per capita under the former and 640 acres under the latter, but
those restrictions were blatantly evaded. For example, Henry Miller, the
largest landowner in California, acquired a 100-mile swathe of riparian
land along the San Joaquin River and 50 miles of riparian land along
the Kern River, much of it obtained fraudulently under the Swamp Act.
The abusive acquisition of land was accompanied by a stretching, if
not abuse, of water rights. "Owners of riparian land have ... . rented
and sold water claimed und_er the riparian doctrine to those who irrigate non-riparian lands, and the right to do this has been sustained in
repeated judicial decisions" (Meade 1903, 194). Other landowners
claimed appropriative rights and used those to monopolize land that
they did not own. They could do this because of the permissive system
for claiming appropriative rights and the legal ambiguity then existing:
Was the amount of the right the amount actually being used, the amount
that could be used given the canal capacity, or the amount the appropriator aspired to use in future? (Pisani 2002, 38). For example, while
the average flow of the Kings River varied from 5,000 to 10,000 cfs in
flood season and from 500 to r,ooo cfs during the low-flow period, the
claims to Kings River water amounted to 750,000 cfs, exclusive of multiple claims to the entire river flow. On the San Joaquin River, six entities each claimed the entire average flow, and the remaining claims
totaled 8 times its maximum flow-152 times its average flow (Meade
1903, 190).
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James Haggin and two partners owned 400,000 acres of land in Kern
County by 1878, but claimed appropriative rights for water to irrigate
two million acres, many times more than the Kern River ever carried .
As their holdings grew, they collided with the downstream riparian
rights of Henry Miller. During a severe drought in 1877, their upstream
diversions dewatered Mi ll er's lands. In May 1879, Miller sued Haggin
and others. The case was tried in 18 8 1, leading to a decision for Haggin. The California Supreme Court heard the case in 1883 and 1884
and ruled for Miller. The majority opinion held that riparian rights were
still va lid in California. This generated inunense public controversy,
and the court agreed to rehear the case. The final decision, in April
1886, again favored Miller. The court ruled tha t riparian rights counted
as property rights under common law, and property rights, once vested,
could not be taken without compensation. 8
California's dual system of inconsistent water rights was thus permanently enshrined. Riparian rights were inherently unquantified. Appropriative rights were quantified incoherently, if at all, and unregulated.
The only mechanism for resolving disputes, which abounded, was litigation. But, as Pisani (1984, 338) notes : "The legal system resolved few
water rights conflicts .... In the absence of a state engineering office,
the courts relied almost entirely on biased witnesses for hydrographic
information . . . . In any case, court tests rarely included all interested
parties, so the decisions were invariably incomplete. Then, too, enforcing a court decree was no easy matter; contempt proceedings were
expensive and subject to the same delays as water rights suits." Some
litigation was epic in its scale. The Kings River was notorious. Litigation began in the drought year of 1876 and escalated, totaling 137 suits
by 1917. The piecemeal judgments in those suits produced some striking anomalies, such as places where "A had rights superior to B, who
had rights superior to C, who had rights superior to A" (Governor's
Commission 1978, 24).
Support for water law reform grew during the drought of 1898-99,
but it was blocked by water users . Change finally came after the election
of a reform governor (Hiram Johnson) and a reform legislature in 19ro.
In 19II, the legislature declared that "All water or the use of water
within the State of California is the property of the people of the State
of California" (Cal. Stats. 19 II, 821 }. It created a State Conservation
Commission to examine the need for new laws to control use of the
state's natural resources. The commission's recommendations were
enacted in the Water Commission Act of 1913. Challenged by water
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users, the legislation was put on the ballot. It was approved by the voters and took effect in December 1914.
The legislation established a State Water Commission, with the
power to regulate unappropriated surface waters of the state. A person
wishing to appropriate water after December 1914 applied to the commission for a permit. If the commission determined that surplus water
was available, the permit was granted. The permit holder then had the
right to take and use the water according to the permit terms. Upon
compliance with the permit terms and demonstration of beneficial use,
the commission issued a license which confirmed the appropriative
right. The commission's authority was initially nondiscretionary: if the
applicant followed the prescribed procedures and unappropriated water
was available, the permit had to be issued . In 1917, the commission was
given discretion to refuse applications deemed detrimenta l to the public
welfare . In 1921, it was given the power to grant a right "under such
terms and conditions" as it judges "in the public interest" and to reject
applications not in the public interest.
Once it had issued a permit or a license, the commission had on ly "a
limited role in resolving disputes and e11forci11g rights of water holders,
a task left mainly to the courts." 9 Thus, while the 1913 act allowed for
the administrative conferral of an appropriative (post-1914) right, as in
Wyoming, the resolution of any subsequent disputes among water right
holders was still left to the courts, as in Co lorado . There were two
routes by which the commission might enter such disputes. First, under
the court "reference" procedure, a court was permitted to transfer a
case to the commission to act as referee. Second, upon its own initiative
or upon request of a water right holder, the commission could conduct
a statutory adjudication of the stream, determining all appropriative
rights to water, whether issued before or after 1914. If they wished,
water users could obtain a judicial review prior to a final decree.
The California system had two key differences from those of Colorado and Wyoming. First, Colorado and \Xlyoming arranged for appropriative rights predating the reform legislation to be brought under that
legislation and adjudicated, whereas California's commission lacked
authority over pre-1914 rights, except in the case of a court reference or
statutory adjudication. Second, while Colorado's water districts and
Wyoming's water divisions provided an administrative apparatus to
supervise the distribution of water, monitoring diversions to ensure conformity with water rights, no such arrangement existed in California.
Supervision of water distribution was opposed by water users at the
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Conservation Commission's hearings; it was dropped by the commission
chair "in a spirit of conciliation. " 10 At the time, commentators saw the
omission of public supervision of water distribution as a serious flaw. 11
The Water Commission had no authority over riparian rights. The
Conservation Commission had wanted to abolish riparian rights but
felt unable to do this (Milter 198 5, r2). Instead, the r 9 r 3 act stipulated
that unused riparian water would be forfeited after ro years of nonuse.
However, the Water Commission had little power to enforce thisriparians could seek relief with the courts-and it was declared unconstitutional in 1935. 12
Once in operation, the Water Commission issued biennial reports.
The first report, in 1917, identified two weaknesses in the 1913 act: lack
of detail regarding procedures for a statutory adjudication, and the lack
of power to supervise water distribution. The legislature responded by
enacting details for an adjudication but did nothing regarding supervision of water distribution. The commission's second biennial report, in
1918, note<l the consequences: "The irrigation season of 1918 has been
one of unusually low run-off. For most streams in northern California,
at least, the run-off this season is the lowest recorded. A number of
requests have been received asking the Commission to send a representative to take charge of the distribution of the water of streams"
(17)-but it lacked authority to do so. The legislature still did nothing.
The drought worsened during the winter of 1919-20. It coincided
with a dramatic increase in rice acreage in the Sacramento Valley, which
required more water than other crops. The rice acreage grew from roo
acres in 1910 an<l 15,000 acres in 1914 to 154,700 acres in 1920 (California State Water Commission 1921, 71). In February, the commission issued a warning of an impending water shortage. The situation
was exacerbated by the lack of reliable data on water rights in the Sacramento Valley (153). The problem was eventually solved by voluntary
action, without the commission's intervention and without enforcement
of seniority. Various agencies organized an Emergency Water Conservation Conference, which included representatives of water users in the
Sacramento Valley. The conference persuaded growers to reduce rice
plantings by 50,000 acres an<l to ensure that water was used "with all
due economy .... Irrigation water was never handled so carefully in the
Sacramento Valley as it was during the summer of 1920" (154-55).
Though the crisis passed, it highlighted "the necessity for an early determination of the underlying rights to divert water from the Sacramento
River." "\Xlithout such a determination," the commission warned,
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"there is absolutely no basis for a diversion of water among the various
claimants in periods of shortage" (155).
The commission's T921 report noted a deluge of applications for new
permits, "far in excess of the natural summer flow" of all the streams in
California, which "has now been fully appropriated and put to use."
Consequently, "the greater portion of the required additional supply
must be developed by the construction of storage reservoirs and regulation of stream flow, holding the flood runoff for use during periods of
low natural flow" (12). Despite the interest in new reservoir projects,
such projects faced the challenge of "how storage water can be released
into a natural stream with assurance of its escaping illegal diversion
before reaching its destination, or how such a reservoir can be operated
to the satisfaction of prior and vested rights of downstream water users"
(13). To answer those questions, the commission believed that California needed "a complete water code"; still lacking were "detailed provisions for the public supervision of the distribution of water ... in
accordance with defined rights, and the appointment of water masters
when needed" (15). Accordingly, it proposed amendments to the 1913
act. There was partial success. The appointment of water masters to
control the use of water was authorized, but only upon written request
of the owners of at least r 5 percent of the diversion facilities in the
region. The recommendation for supervision of water distribution was
ignored.
Thus, when California did finally act, it conceded to politically powerful interests. Compared to other western states, the California commission was weakened by the exclusion of riparian rights and pre-1914
appropriative rights, and had littl e power to enforce post-1914 appro priative rights.

CONSOLIDATION
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In July 1921, the commission ceased existence. A new Department of
Public Works came into existence, and the commission's functions and
duties were assumed by its Division of Water Rights. In its 1924 report,
looking back to the 1913 act, the division observed that, when the commission started, it had "faced a most difficult situation" because of "the
maze of legal entanglement" associated with riparian and pre-1914
appropriative rights. It conceded that the legal situation had not
changed, "nor has litigation over water matters been done away with.
It has, however, been greatly reduced" (9).
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Given the lack of authority over riparian and pre-1914 appropriative
rights, and the small quantity of post-1914 appropriative rights, how
was litigation reduced? Two tools existed for determining pre-1914
rights (the court reference procedure and statutory adjudication), and
one tool for supervising the distribution of water under existing rights
(a water master). But either a court or the water users had to request
these actions. 13 All the commission or division could do on its own
authority was to conduct special hydrological investigations; field investigations were also part of reviewing permit applications and determining whether unappropriated water was available. Those investigations
turned out to be crucial.
The investigations had a "moral effect," because "technical and legal
information on points formally so obscure can now be secured from an
authoritative and impartial source. The assistance of the Division is
sought in controversies over water matters not necessarily within the
scope of the [1913] act" (Division of Water Rights 1924, ro). As the
division noted:
In any legal controversy over water it is most often the questions of fact
which are at issue .... Whether or not the Division has any quasi-judicial
function, it can, if it is in possession of the facts regarding conditions on a
stream, make known these facts to the interested parties in the issue and the
matter is then susceptible of compromise .... The Division acts in the nature
of a bureau in answering questions regarding water right principles. In this,
it has been of much service in settling difficulties, in clearing up a number of
intricate water tangles, and in bringing together those who desired an equitable settlement of their difficulties, but were in doubt as how best to proceed. It is believed that much useless and expensive litigation has been
avoided through this service. (Division of Water Rights 1922, 9)

Thus, the division saw "its largest function" as "a fact finding and
recording body" (9 ).
Three factors helped the division bring some order to the tangle of
water rights. First, in assessing permit applications it bypassed "paper"
water rights and focused on whether unappropriated flow was available.
Frequently, "those claiming vested rights admit that there is unappropriated water available to a new appropriator in the source from which they
are already diverting and do not object to a new diversion, provided their
prior rights are respected" (Division of Water Rights 1924, 38). Second,
in 1923 the division was allowed to modify its procedure for protested
permit applications: it could now hold a hearing before the decision,
instead of afterwards. This had substantial procedural and psychological
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impacts. "Particularly in the la rger and more important cases, the action
of the Division is expedited, as each of the contesting parties assumes a
greater share of the burden in preparing his own case and presents it in
better shape, thus overcoming the tendency for such matters to drag
on .... It may also be noted that the hearing procedure through its formality discourages trivial protests and has tended toward the adoption of
a new mental attitude on the part of those whose interests are jeopardized
by proposed appropriations." 14 Third, the division extended its influence
through its readiness to conduct informal investigations. "While some
[requests for a hydrographic investigation) come to the Division as
requests for adjudication, others come as a request for an informal physical investigation. In some instances the existing rights are so complicated
... that it is felt that the formal adjudication procedure might not be successful; however, if the physical facts can be determined by investigation
this will suffice" (Division of Water Rights 1922, 14).
Thus, a degree of order came to California's water rights administration. But this occurred only if the water users invited it. Thus, water
users on the Kings River decided in 1917 to end their litigation wars
and request a water master, because they wanted a dam (the Pine Flat
Dam) , for which a determi nation of existing water rights was needed
(California State Water Commission 1921, 14). There were other cases
where the water users wanted no intervention; there, the courthouse
remained the only venue for dispute resolution.

WATER MANAGEMENT TllROUGII TIIE COURTS

One dispute involved upstream diversions and downstream water quality in the Delta. While the Delta waters are tidal, they are not saline,
except in late summer and fall when low outflow from the Sacramento
and San Joaquin Rivers permits saltwater to advance inland. During the
1920 drought, the Sacramento River flow dropped by about 90 percent,
to a record low of 420 cfs, coupled with record salinity intrusion into
the Delta. In July 1920, the Delta town of Antioch sued upstream irrigators in the Sacramento Valley to stop their diversions from causing
salinity to reach the intake for the town's water supply (itself a diversion
of less than T cfs). At least 3,500 cfs of Delta flow was needed for an
acceptable salinity level. In 1922 the California Supreme Court rejected
the suit because "it would be hard to conceive of a greater waste for so
small a benefit" than to require that an addi tional 3,080 cfs flow unused
to the ocean to provide less than 1 cfs for municipal use .
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This case raised two fundamental issues. First, could a water right be
used to regulate streamflow for water quality, in this case salinity? The
Antioch court recognized that "an appropriator of water from a stream
for domestic and similar uses has the right to enjoin the pollution of the
stream above him," but considered that diverting water, as opposed to
discharging something noxious into a stream, could not be considered
an action "that in the least affects the purity of the water." Thus, streamflow was not a water quality parameter. Second, should the interests of
downstream water users prevent the construction of upstream storage?
The court noted that, if it acceded to Antioch's request, this would set a
precedent that could impede the construction of storage, an outcome
"highly detrimental to the public interests."
Storage was of keen interest. The 1920 drought demonstrated that
additional storage was needed to accommodate new applications for
water rights. Also, since the early 1900s electric utilities had become
interested in hydropower; these included Southern California Edison,
which was looking to the headwaters of the San Joaquin River.
The 1913 act limited annual water use on uncultivated riparian land
to 2.5 acre-feet per acre. This was at issue in Herminghaus v. Southern
California Edison (1926). The Herminghaus family owned undeveloped riparian land along the San Joaquin River, used for pasture and,
since 1896, leased to Henry Miller. For forage, they had the practice of
temporarily damming the river during the spring runoff so that it overflowed the land and produced a crop of natural grasses. Their 1913 act
limit was approximately 54,000 acre-feet, but they diverted the entire
river flood flow, around r.8 million acre-feet. Edison had riparian rights
to the upper San Joaquin, and constructed its first hydropower facility
in 1911. In the 1920s it was planning to expand that system . Its reservoirs would store water used to flood the Herminghaus lands, and Herminghaus sued. Edison claimed the right, as a riparian, to store water
when the volume of flow far exceeded the needs of downstream irrigators, releasing it in the late summer when irrigation water was in short
supply while generating electricity for public use. Herminghaus argued
that it had a riparian right to divert the flood water.
The court ruled that the riparian right did include the use of flood
waters, but it did not include storage, so Edison impounded water as a
mere appropriator. The public benefit of Edison's reservoirs was irrelevant. At that time, California courts applied a standard of reasonable
use in disputes among riparians, among appropriators, and between a
riparian and an appropriator where the riparian claimed unreasonable
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use by the appropriator. But they refused to apply reasonable use to a
claim by an appropriator against a riparian. Following that principle,
the lower court ruled for Herminghaus. On appeal, the California
Supreme Court upheld the ruling. There was a wave of public outrage.
There was also "a rash of new cases" against hydropower projects
(Miller 1989, 103 ). In response, the legis lature placed a constitutional
amendment on the ballot declaring that "the general welfare requires
that the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest
extent of which they are capable," and required that all surface water
use-riparian and appropriative alike-be reasonable and beneficial.
The amendment passed in November 1928 .

CONSTRUCTING A IIYDRAULIC SOCIETY

By then, California was immersed in water projects. The notion of transferring surplus Sacramento River water to the drier San Joaquin Valley
was first suggested in 1858 and was the subject of extensive investigations by the State Engineer, William Hammond Hall, in T877-88. It
resurfaced in 1919 in a proposal by Robert Marshall. Prompted by the
1920 drought, the legislature allocated funds for water resources investigations and, following the 1924 drought, it allocated additional funds.
The report, in 1927, offered a coordinated plan for developing the state's
water resources (Division of Engineering and Irrigation 1927). That was
a banner year. Besides placing the constitutional amendment on the ballot, the legislature authorized the Department of Finance to file to reserve
appropriative water rights that might be needed for a statewide water
plan, with the notion that it would assign those rights only to users
whose projects conformed to that plan . 15
In 1929, water planning move<l into high gear. The Division of Water
Rights was combined with the Division of Engineering and Irrigation
within the Department of Public Works to form a single Division of
Water Resources. Funding was allocated for an expanded water planning effort. The product was a detailed proposal for a State Water Plan
(Division of Water Resources 1931 ). The plan's main focus was to provide storage upstream in the Sacramento Valley and to transfer water to
the San Joaquin Valley.
In 1933, the legislature endorsed the project and authorized a bond
issue, which was narrowly approved by voters. With California then in
the depths of the Great Depression, the state made no attempt to sell
the bonds. Instead, it turned to the federal government for help, first
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seeking grant or loan assistance and then, with those not forthcoming,
asking it to take over the project. In 19 3 5, President Roosevelt released
emergency relief funds so that work could begin. In 19 3 7, Congress
formally approved the Central Valley Project (CVP) as a Bureau of Reclamation project. Construction of Shasta Dam started in 1937 and was
completed in 1945; the hydropower and other ancillary facilities were
completed in 19 50. Construction of Friant Dam a lso started in 193 7; it
was completed in 1942. The Madera Canal was completed in 1945, and
the Friant-Kern and Delta-Mendota Canals in 1951.
The war led to a boom in California's agriculture and economy, and
it continued afterwards . Irrigated acreage grew from 5 .1 million acres
in 1939 to 6.6 million acres in 1949. The population increased from 6.9
million in 1940 to ro.6 million in 19 50. The growth in potential demand
for water clearly outstripped the supply expansion from the CVP.
California, by then chafing at federal control of the CVP, created a
water planning authority in 1945 and funded a state-wide water resources
investigation in 1947. In 1951, a report was released proposing a new
large dam in the Sacramento Valley and an aqueduct through the San
Joaquin Valley to Southern California (California State Water Resources
Board 19 51). That year, the legislature authorized what became the State
Water Project (SWP) and appropriated funds for detailed engineering
studies. This gained further momentum from a massive flood in 19 5 6
which the new dam could have prevented. To implement the project, the
Department of Water Resources was created that year as a superagency
vested with all the powers and responsibilities relating to water from the
Department of Public Works and other state agencies. In 1957, the department issued the culminating product of the decade-long state water investigation, a comprehensive master plan for the SWP. In 1959, the legislature authorized bonds for the first stage of the SWP. This was the largest
bond issue ever offered by any state, and it was made subject to voter
approval. The bond was narrowly approved in an election in 1960; the
northern counties, reluctant to send "their" water south, rejected the proposal; the southern counties, containing the majority of the beneficiaries,
provided the margin of victory.
Meanwhile, the CVP was also being expanded. Folsom Dam was completed in 1956, and Trinity Dam in 1963. The CVP division delivering
water to the west side of the Sacramento Valley was largely completed by
1965. The new CVP and SWP dams released water into the Sacramento
River to flow into the Delta for pumping southward. This required additional pumping capacity in the Delta and additional conveyance capacity
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in the San Joaquin Valley. These were supplied through a federal-state
partnership, which included a new aqueduct. The federal portion was
known as the San Luis Aqueduct. The SWP portion, known as the California Aqueduct, carried water over into Southern California. Construction of the CVP portion was completed in 1968, and of the SWP portion
in 1973. With that, California's modern hydraulic system was in place.
That system represented a strategy of supply expansion rather than
more efficient management of existing resources. What was the role of
water rights in the strategy?
The 1928 constitutional amendment was cruci al. Without it, most of
the new dams could not have been built. However, following a 1935
Supreme Court ruling, the reasonable use doctrine fell into dormancy,
losing the effective abi lity to restrict wasteful water use. Also, when the
Division of Water Rights was folded into the Division of Water Resources
in 1929, this reduced the resources and attention devoted to water rights
administration.
The projects' financing was based on water users' paying the cost of
the water supplied by the project. For those receiving water from the
new CVP canals, that amount could readily be quantified. 16 Not so for
users diverting water from the San Joaquin or Sacramento River. With
the San Joaquin River, which would be dried up downstream of Friant
Dam, the diverters would receive a like amount of water from the DeltaMendota Canal as a free replacement. 17 The Shasta and Trinity Dams
changed the seasonal timing and volume of Sacramento River streamflow, producing less flow in the spring but more in the late summer, and
created the risk that existing diverters would grab the augmented lateseason flow. These diverters could divert the amount of their pre-existing right to river water (their base supply) for free; if they wished, they
could divert an extra quantity, for which they paid (project water). 18
Determining those quantities of water was problematic. For existing
users with riparian rights, there was no quantity associated with their
right. For users with pre-1914 appropriative rights, those rights
remained unquantified because they were outside the Water Commission Act's purview. For users with post-1914 rights senior to the CVP,
the loose administration of post-1914 water rights made those quantities uncertain, too.
The burden of negotiating quantities fell on the CVP and SWP. This
was harder in the Sacramento Valley than in the San Joaquin Valley.
In the San Joaquin Valley, a key factor was Henry Miller's dominance. He had been exceptionally litigious in protecting his water rights .
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A 193 3 suit against the Madera Irrigation District had generated "nearly
a complete adjudication of rights" to the San Joaquin River upstream of
Mendota Pool (Graham 1950, 597). Moreover, his company was now
in a period of decline and, for severa l reasons, "needed to sell its water
rights before it lost them" (Garone 2011, 165). In 1939, it reached an
agreement w ith Reclamation to sell the water that flooded its pasture
lands, and it received an exchange contract to provide substitute water
for its irrigated croplands in the San Joaquin Valley. The agreement
became the model for contracts with other riparian landowners and
ultimately fixed the level of their compensation (Miller 1992, 173). 19
In the Sacramento Valley, there were many small landowners, with
no dominant land owner like Miller and little prior litigation that might
have quantified water rights. Impounded water flowed along the river
channel to the Delta. The legal point for CVP and S\VP diversions was
near the Delta, several hundred miles downstream from the points of
storage, with many intervening users in between. As the state's chief
water lawyer warned in 1942, whether an adequate amount of project
water would be available for export depended "upon the degree to
which the rights of these intervening users are defined with exactitude,
as well as the extent to which those users vo luntarily confine themselves
thereto. In the existing condition of human nature it may be confidently
predicted that [they], finding an abnormal increment in the stream, will
each for himself define and exercise their rights in their own favor
with substantial elasticity" (Holsinger 1942, 13). Exactitude in the definition of those rights required a statutory adjudication. The Reclamation supervisor in Sacramento had recommended this in 1939, but his
superiors in Washington rejected it. California now proposed this in
December 1942, but Washington again rejected it. By 1951, with the
CVP in full operation, the situation had worsened. Sacramento Valley
diversions, which had averaged about 1 mi ll ion acre-feet annually from
1924 to 1940, soared to 2 million acre-feet in 1951. More diversions
meant less project exports. Reclamation leadership was concerned
enough to consider requesting an adjudication. At that point, the water
users in the Valley brought Congressional pressure on Reclamation to
abandon that notion (Bain, Caves, and Margolis 1966, 477 ). For
another decade, Reclamation and the Sacramento River water users
continued to disagree about water amounts for settlement contracts.
Finally, after 20 years of negotiations, and und er pressure from the Secretary of the Interior, Reclamation began signing settlement contracts
in 1964.
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THE WATER RIGHTS BOARD ERA

To prevent further conflict of interest, the 1956 reorganization that created the Department of Water Resources to operate the S\W also established a separate entity, the State Water Rights Board (SWRB), which
assumed the responsibilities of the Department of Public Works regarding surface water rights. The new SWRB was a diminished version of
the 1920s Division of Water Rights, and had less ability to manage postr9T 4 rights. It lost the authority to provide water master service, which
stayed with the Department of Water Resources. That department also
retained many experienced staff, including engineers employed in field
investigations to measure water diversions, which "severely handicapped" the SWRB and limited its effectiveness (California State Water
Rights Board 1957, 34). It faced a "heavy backlog" of applications for
new permits, accumulated "over a long period of years" (Holsinger
1957, 686).
With new applications, the SWRB tightened the information requirements to validate the amount of water claimed. But it was in a weak
position with respect to existing rights, lacking authority over riparian
and pre-1914 rights, and with few resources to monitor post-1914
rights. 20 There was no more collection of data on diversions. 21 In 1965,
an ineffectual attempt was made to change this, motivated by concerns
over uncapped riparian diversions. Riparians and appropriators with
both pre- and post-1914 rights were required to file a statement every
three years with the SWRB detailing their monthly diversions. 22 But the
information was "for information purposes only," and failure to file
lacked legal consequences. Smaller diverters in the Delta and others
received exemptions. The result was little compliance: in 1978, only ro
percent of holders of riparian and pre-1914 rights filed statements.23
The SWRB was also in a weak position to address the water projects.
Though the CVP's permits had not yet been issued-this was the immediate task for the SWRB-it was delivering water on a massive scale as
a fait accomp/i. The SWRB could approve permits for the CVP (and
SWP) only if ( 1) unappropriated water was available, (2) this was in the
public interest, and (3) it di<l not impair existing vested rights. That
depended on the amount of water controlled by existing vested rights,
something not clearly known and beyond the authority of the SWRB to
determine. 24 There had been a conscious decision in 1939-42 and in
1951 against holding an adjudication , and the SWRB was not going to
touch that.
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In its first CVP decision in 1958 (D-893), the SWRB considered
applications to divert American River water by the CVP, the city of
Sacramento, and various others, significantly exceeding the river flow.
There also were state applications for future water developments in
upstream counties, and flows for fish conservation requested by the
Department of Fish and Game. There were multiple protests, including
claims that the diversions would harm vested rights downstream by
increasing salinity in the Delta. The SWRB rejected most of the applications but granted the CVP and Sacramento applications, subject to (1)
future agreements among the parties to control Delta salinity, (2) future
reductions for within-watershed development, and (3) compliance with
recent Fish and Game agreements for fish flows. 25 This set the pattern
for CVP and SWP applications : the SWRB granted the projects' applications 011 an interim basis subject to the resolution of ongoing negotiations about vested water rights, salinity levels, and/or fish conditions. At
intervals, the SWRB reopened the decision process, heard evidence, and
made a new interim decision on similar terms. This pattern of deference
to negotiations among the interested parties continues to the present
day, and the negotiations remain largely unresolved. 16
\Vhat did change was the growing power of environmental concerns.
In 1949, California adopted the first comprehensive water pollution
control law in the United States, creating a statewide water pollution
control agency. By 1961, interest in water quality had broadened beyond
human health protection: enhancement of fish and wildlife resources
was declared an official purpose of the SWP. The issue of salinity in the
Delta refused to go away. In the 1940s, the CVP's strategy was to rely
on releases from Shasta to control salinity in the Delta. In the r95os, the
CVP backed away from that commitment. The Delta was the hub for
moving project water to agricultural and urban users in the San Joaquin
Valley and Southern California. Salinity in the Delta mattered to users
both there and in export areas. In 19 59, the Delta Protection Act was
passed, mandating that the Delta be kept fresh enough for these purposes. Freshwater releases not only reduced salinity but also protected
fish and the Delta's aquatic ecosystem. The two concerns became mutually reinforcing. A 1966 legislative report asserted that downstream
water quality was receiving inadequate attention from the SWRB: "The
problem of resolving the protection which the Delta water users should
receive, based on their vested rights, is beyond the ability of the presently organized SWRB to solve" (California Assembly Interim Committee on Water 1966, 28). The report called for the combination of water
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rights and water quality regulation in a single entity. In 1967, the State
Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) was created, combining the
functions of the SWRB and the water pollution agency. In 1972, when
the federa l Clean Water Act mandated state water pollution regulation
under EPA oversight, the SWRCB became the state's designated water
pollution regulation agency and its water rights agency.
The SWRCB started off energetically, but then bogged down. Its first
Delta decision, D-1379 in 1971, strengthened the conditions imposed
earlier for salinity control and fish protection, and introduced new
water quality standards to protect agricultural and urban uses in the
Delta. But before the decision could be implemented, it was stayed by a
suit challenging the SWRCB's authority to impose conditions on permits held by Reclamation as a federal agency. The U.S. Supreme Court
resolved the legal issue in the SWRCB's favor in July 1978. In August
1978, the SWRCB issued D-1485 together with a Delta water quality
control plan . These further strengthened water quality standards and
introduced monitoring for compliance. To ensure that Delta water quality would not be impaired by the projects, D-148 5 required them to
release water and/or curtail diversions if the flow into the Delta would
otherwise be insufficient.27 It was greeted with a barrage of lawsuits
from water users. In 1986, a California Court of Appeal ruling dismissed the challenges to the SWRCB's authority.
By then, compared to the SWRB in 1956, the SWRCB had powerful
tools in its water rights arsenal. As Gray (chapter 4, this volume) shows,
California courts used the reasonable use doctrine, revived by the 1967
Joslin decision, to enhance the SWRCB's regulatory jurisdiction with a
reasonableness criterion responsive to changing circumstances. The
1986 Appeal Court rnling held that D-148 5 was too narrow. While,
under water law, the SWRCB had respected vested nonproject rights in
conditioning project permits, under its water quality authority it could
regulate all water users to ensure a reasonable level of water quality
protection. Both sources of authority should be exploited. And the public trust doctrine, upheld in the 1983 National A11dubo11 ruling, gave the
SWRCB power to overturn settled water rights if subsequently found to
violate the public trust, including protection of environmental resources.
Thus armed, a more ambitious SWRCB reopened its decision process.
A draft report in November 1988 called for a "California Water Ethic"
with more vigorous urban and agricultural conservation, a cap on Delta
exports, and tighter water quality standards. The water users howled,
and the governor pressured the SWRCB to withdraw the draft and let the
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parties negotiate among themselves. Following agreement between urban
and environmental, but not agricultural, interests, the SWRCB issued a
draft decision, D-1630, which limited exports in dry years and required
additional fish flows. At the behest of agricultural users, the governor
vetoed the decision in April 1993, leaving D-148 5 still in place.
Now the EPA intervened, threatening to impose its own water quality standards for the Delta. An eleventh-hour agreement averted this in
1994, establishing CALFED, a collaborative planning process overseen
by state and federal agencies and key stakeholders, largely sidelining the
SWRCB.28 CALFED produced some positive results, including scientific
investigations, but no agreement. Native fish species continued a steep
decline, with no simple remedy in sight. With leadership changes in
Washington and Sacramento, the political support and funding that had
sustained CALFED a decade earlier evaporated, and it was terminated
in 2006 (Hanemann and Dyckman 2009).
CALFED was blamed for failing to reverse the Delta ecosystem's
decline or to improve supply reliability for water users. Yet CALFED had
no power to limit diversions or set water quality standards-those powers remained with the SWRCB. The SWRCB is tasked with "the orderly
and efficient administration of the water resources of the state" (Water
Code, Article 174). It has "primary responsibility" for implementing the
reasonable use doctrine and for ensuring "meaningful implementation of
the public trust" (Robie 2012a, 117 5-76). It has not lived up to those
obligations, instead displaying chronic passivity and regularly deferring
to hoped-for stakeholder agreement.29 Why? The water rights section
was, and is, chronically understaffed for both water use monitoring and
scientific analysis. The board is under the governor's thumb, whether
indirectly or through his open intervention. Governors, kowtowing to
water users, have controlled the board.Jo This is a political failure: a lack
of political will to ensure that the board's regulatory functions are performed.
The S\WCB's weakness affects not only permits and water quality
standards but also the enforcement of water rights generally.Ji Riparian
and pre-1914 rights remain largely unverified and unquantified. Compliance inspections of diverters during 1998-2003 found that 3 8 percent were in violation of their water rights, and another r r percent were
subject to revocation for nonuse. In three watersheds, an inspection
found 50 percent of small reservoirs diverting without a right (California State Water Resources Control Board 2008, 6). Besides personnel,
enforcement authority was still inadequate. "Currently, [the SWRCB]
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does not possess sufficient authority to effectively monitor and enforce
water right laws . ... In particular, the law does not (r) provide clear
authority for SWRCB to require monitoring by diverters, (2) authorize
monetary penalties for monitoring and reporting violations, (3) have
adequate penalties for unauthorized diversions and violations of cease
and desist order, and (4) have provisions for interim relief" (8).
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Around 200 5, new concerns arose that the Delta was in crisis due to
ecosystem decline and levee vulnerability to seismic and erosion risks.
Levee failure could permit massive saltwater intrusion, jeopardizing
water exports to the south. In March 2007, Governor Schwarzenegger
appointed a Delta Vision Blue Ribbon Task Force, mandating a report
by November 2007 and a strategic plan by October 2008. Legislation
implementing those recommendations was introduced in February
2009, but bogged down amid water user opposition. It emerged, somewhat shorn, in the last hours of the session in November 2009. It established "the two coequal goals of providing a more reliable water supply
for California, and protecting, restoring and enhancing the Delta ecosystem." To that end, a Delta Stewardship Council was created, tasked
with developing a comprehensive Delta Plan. It created a \Xlatermaster
for the Delta, appointed by the SWRCB and the Delta Stewardship
Council, to "exercise the [SWRCB's] authority to provide timely monitoring and enforcement of [the SWRCB's] orders and . . . permit terms."
It introduced penalties for failure to file diversion reports, removed the
reporting exemption for in-Delta diverters, and authorized additional
enforcement staff for the SWRCB. Missing were increased penalties for
illegal water diversions, enhanced SWRCB enforcement authority, and
independent power to initiate an adjudication. 32
The Delta Watermaster has displayed vigor and independence in
monitoring diversions and enforcing water rights in the Delta . Compliance with the diversion-reporting requirement is now 99 percent in the
Delta, and 70 to 8 5 percent elsewhere. Overall, however, the S\'VRCB's
monitoring and enforcement authority for water rights remain "weak"
and "inconsistent with its broad enforcement authority over water
quality" (Wilson 2012, 3, 10) .
Yet, following the declaration of a drought emergency in January
20 1 4, the SWRCB has shown unaccustomed forcefulness, more than in
previous droughts .
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In the 1977 drought, the SWRCB sent out 4,858 notices of shortage
on various streams. Based on projections of summer demand and
streamflow, the notices identified time periods when each broad user
category (riparian, pre-1914 or post-1914) could take no water or had
to reduce diversions by a given percentage. However, lacking the authority to supervise water distribution, the SWRCB relied for enforcement
on complaints received and field visits. In May 2014, based on similar
projections of demand and streamflow, the SWRCB issued 8,596 notices
of curtailment for all post-1914 rights in the Sacramento-San Joaquin
watershed, requiring submission of curtailment certification within
seven days. 33 There was only a 29-percent response. Invoking its reasonable use authority, the SWRCB adopted emergency regulations in July
to streamline and better enforce curtailment, subjecting noncertification
of future curtai lment to a penalty of $500 per day. 34 It also adopted
emergency regulations mandating urban water suppliers to impose conservation measures equivalent to limiting outdoor use to two days per
week, with monthly monitoring reports required.
These actions also exposed the SWRCB's weaknesses. Commenters
complained that the proposed 2014 emergency regulations were illegal if
applied to riparian or pre-1914 rights. By disregarding individual facts
and circumstances and making a blanket determination of unreasonable
use for a broad user category, the S\VRCB had violated due process. The
shortage projections were unreliable because the SWRCB's diversion
data were incomplete (prc-1914 data lacks priority dates), unverified,
and inaccurate. The curtailments shielded the projects from their existing
responsibility to meet Delta water quality standards, and were an attempt
to shift that responsibility to other users without a formal decision process. It is presently unknown whether those objections will be litigated
and sustained. Also unknown is whether the SWRCB's new forcefulness
will continue when the drought ends.

CONCLUSION
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California started out with a surface water right that was extremely
unsuited to its location in a semi-arid region with highly variable stream
flow. While still keeping the riparian right, it invented another type of
water r ight, the appropriative right, which became the standard in the
other Western states. As originally implemented in California, the appropriative right lacked effective recording, quantification or enforcement.
Other states discovered this once they emu lated California's system, but
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they soon instituted reforms that made the appropriative right more
functional. The reforms provided a usable record of who had rights and
with what seniority, and an apparatus on the ground for monitoring
diversions and enforcing seniority. Moreover, while appropriative rights
obtained earlier were initially grandfathered, they were subsequently
brought into compliance with the new administrative system. In California, by contrast, reform of appropriative rights was long blocked by
water users and arrived relatively late, in 1914. When California acted,
what it did was limited. There was recording of post-19 14 rights but not
supervision of the distribution of water to ensure conformity with those
rights. Pre-1914 rights stayed outside the authority of the SWRCB and
its predecessors; they still remain unquantified in many cases, and they
require litigation to quantify or enforce them. Riparian rights are also
outside the SWRCB's authority, and they are unenforceable and unquantifiable except through litigation. A systematic quantification of surface
water rights in California's Central Valley would require a statutory
adjudication or something equivalent. This was mooted several times,
including in 1939, 1942, and 195T, but was rejected as too time-conswning. Seventy-five years later, it is still needed.
The system of water rights affects the allocation of surface water in
several ways. It hinders the re-allocation of water through water marketing. Riparian rights can be transferred to nonriparian land only
through guile. Without more formal verification, unquantified or poorly
quantified appropriative rights can be leased short-term but not leased
long-term or permanently transferred. Hence, the vast majority of water
marketing in California has been restricted to short-term leases. When
there is a drought, the system's weaknesses show up. In past droughts,
water suppliers and users have worked things out informally among
themselves, sidelining the SWRCB or its predecessors and largely
bypassing seniority. When the SWRCB did attempt to enforce seniority,
it acted in a simplistic manner: in the 1977 and 2014 droughts, it treated
all post-1914 r ights as the same without regard to seniority within the
category. (It did the same in 1977 for pre-1914 rights, treating them as
a homogeneous category.) The lack of data on quantities associated
with water rights and on actual diversions left no alternative. The system performs worst with regard to the allocation of water between
instream and off-stream uses. Large-scale diversions have been occurring from the Delta since 1949, but there is still no authoritative determination of responsibility for meeting Delta water quality objectives.
The SWRCB has relied so far on restricting CVP and SWP diversions to
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meet those objectives, despite the 1986 Appeal Court ruling that it
could regulate all water users to ensure a reasonable level of water quality protection in the Delta. As the demand for water in California grows,
as the Delta ecosystem declines, and as drought becomes more common
with climate change, the SWRCB's failure to exercise its full legal
authority will become increasingly burdensome and costly.

NOTES
I. Space precludes discussion of groundwater rights in California. Put simply, that situation has been even worse, although legislation enacted in September 2014 may eventually lead to some effective regulation of groundwater overdraft.
2. That restriction was not initially enforced in California.
3. Some of these details emerged gradually through court rulings 111 the
period 1897-1927.
4. Meade (1903, 199-202) provides several examples where, between 1860
and 1890, ditch companies lost their entire investmen ts because they were unaware of superior appropriative rights elsewhere on the stream.
5. ln order to secure a complete and consistent settlement of water rights to a
stream, all potential claimants must be brought into the same suit, either through
a suit to quiet title or through a procedure known as a stream adjudication.
6. The states adopting appropriative rights as the only form of surface water
right were Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and
Wyoming. The states maintaining a dual system of riparian and appropriative
rights were Kansas, Nebraska, the Dakotas, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, and
Washington (relatively humid, non-mining states).
7. Nebraska, Nevada, Utah, Idaho, the Dakotas, New Mexico, and Arizona .
8. The court ruled that under certain conditions that did not hold in this
case-if the appropriator began using water from a stream before a riparian
acquired his property-the appropriation doctrine would prevail.
9. United States v. State Water Resources Control Board, 182 Cal. App. 3d
82 (1986), p. 170 (italics in original).
10. Wiel (1914, 446), states that " there was a promise of opposition to the
bill if such provisions went into it."
1r. Wiel (1914, 446); Chandler (19r3, 162, 168). Chandler comments,
"There is little use in securing an adjudication unless properly authorized officia ls are charged with the regulation of headgates in accordance therewith."
12. The commission originally had authority over riparian rights in a statutory adjudication; that authority was removed in 1917. It had authority over
riparian rights in a court reference if the court so decided.
13. Under the 1913 act, the commission (or division) was authorized to initiate an adjudication on its own authority. As of 1922, this authority had never
been exercised (Division of Water Rights 1922, 8). It was never exercised subsequently, either.
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14. Division of Water Rights (1924, 38). Another modification in 1923
changed the filing fee from a flat charge to a fee that varied according to the
amount of water applied for. This "played an important role in eliminating
many purely speculative filings" (Division of Water Rights 1926, 26).
15. The legislation waived the diligence requirement that these rights be
exercised within a fixed period or be lost.
16. These users received what were called water service contracts.
17. These contractors arc exchange contractors, because they exchanged
their right to river water for CVP deliveries.
18. These contractors are settle111e11t contractors. The SW'P also has some
settlement contractors on the Feather River.
19 . Following litigation, owners of land along the dewatered San Joaquin
River segment received compensation for the loss of their land value.
20. Authority to prevent unreasonable use of water remained exclusively
with the Department of Water Resources until 1971.
21. Starting with the 1924 drought, there had been an annual inventory of
individual diversions in the Central Valley. This ceased in 1956.
22. For post-1914 rights, the "face value" (maximum diversion) is known,
but the amount actually diverted is "only a fraction of face value" and is "undetermined" (California State Water Resources Control Board 2008, 4).
23. Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law (1978,
18). During the 1977 drought, the SWRCB received about 150 complaints of
illegal diversions or violations of permit terms. Upon investigation, 30 cases
were found to merit enforcement actions. This was "the first time since enactment of the Water Commission Act in 1914 that the State has enforced its
jurisdiction to enjoin illegal diverters" (Division of Water Rights 1978, 18).
24. The Governor's Commission (1978, 26) suggested that, once signed, the
settlement and exchange contracts provided de facto quantification of the riparian and pre-1914 rights of CVP contractors . But those contracts represented a
judgment by an agency (Reclamation) that lacked the authority to determine
water rights in California. Similarly with the S\VP contracts signed by the
Department of Water Resources. Olson and Mahaney (2005, 82), staff counsel
to SWRB's successor, reject the commission's suggestion: "Various agencies
conducted studies in order to make assumptions regarding the physical characteristics involved, including estimates of existing water rights. However, these
studies did not determine actual water rights, and clearly state that assumptions
may differ substantially from the actual rights as determined in a court or by the
[SWRB]."
25. In 1959, the SWRB received formal authority to reserve jurisdiction to
modify or delete terms when issuing CVP and SWP permits.
26. See Hanemann and Dyckman (2009), who argue that the negotiations
are a zero-sum game, thus inherently incapable of yielding a stable bargaining
outcome.
27. In 1981, the SWRCB added a condition, Term 91, prohibiting users junior to the projects from making diversions when stored project water was being
released to meet Delta quality standards. First seen as an interim measure pending more comprehensive studies of water availability for all diverters, and then
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made permanent when that approach was abandoned "due to lack of adequate
data," this condition was applied to permits with post-1978 rights, and subsequently to some post-1965 permits. Invoked almost every year since 1984, it
covers only 233 out of 5,500 diverters, and enforcement is limited.
28. In 199 5 the SWRCB adopted a Delta Water Quality Plan with new
standards for fish and wildlife, based on recommendations agreed to by the parties. It planned a water rights hearing to allocate responsibility for meeting
flow-dependent objectives, but canceled this "to facilitate negotiations" that
might lead to a settlement among the parries, meanwhile leaving the CVP and
SWP with ultimate responsibility for those objectives (D-1641, WRO-200105). Despite legal challenges, the decision was largely upheld in 2006, except
that the court ruled that the SWRCB could not substitute flow objectives agreed
to by the parties for those in the 199 5 plan.
29. See Robie (2012b, 9-n): "the Board has been too timid in its leadership,
and overall has been a disappointment ... . It remains critical for the [SWRCB] to
take a more active role in applying the reasonable use and public trust doctrines
... of its OI/Jn accord. ... I urge the Board to be more proactive, more bold . ..
in fulfilling its adjudicatory and regulatory functions." Also see Nawi and MacMillan (2008, 4): "When [the SWRCB] has taken effective action, this has tended
to be the result of consensus reached by parties outside the Board's process."
30. The formulation currently used by the governor's staff when telling you
that you are off the board is: "The space is needed for someone else."
31. From 1983 to about 2000, Sawyer (2005, 36) notes, the SWRCl3 "was
less interested in water right enforcement" due partly to gubernatorial directives and partly to staff shortages, as personnel were reallocated from enforcement to other tasks . (Staffing resources, of course, also reflect gubernatorial
priorities.) Interest in enforcement revived somewhat thereafter.
32. The last was recommended, to no avail, by the Governor's Commission
in 1978 as well as by the Delta Task Force in 2008 .
33. The notice warned that, if current conditions continue, the SWRCB
might also curtail pre-1914 and riparian diversions.
34. The draft regulations applied to all diverters, including pre-1914 and
riparians; pre-1914 and riparian rights were omitted from the version adopted .
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